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Abstract—This paper aims to identify and analyze the initial
contingencies or disturbances that could lead to the worst-case
cascading failures of power grids. An optimal control approach
is proposed to determine the most disruptive disturbances on
the branch of power transmission system by regarding the
disturbances as the control inputs. Moreover, protective actions
such as load shedding and generation dispatch are taken into
account in a convex optimization framework to prevent the
cascading outages of power grids. In theory, the necessary
conditions for identifying the most disruptive disturbances are
obtained by solving an integrated system of algebraic equations.
Finally, numerical simulations are carried out to validate the
proposed approach on the IEEE RTS 24 Bus System.
Index Terms—cascading failure, optimal control, load shed-
ding, generation dispatch, contingency
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past decades, the world has suffered from several
major blackouts such as US-Canada Blackout in 2003 [1],
European Blackout in 2006 [2], India Blackout in 2012 and
Brazil Blackout in 1999 [3]. All the major blackouts have
caused huge economic losses and affected millions of people.
Due to the complexity of electrical power systems, it has
been a great challenge to understand, analyze and identify the
cascading blackouts in practical power grids.
According to the analysis of technological reports, power
system blackouts normally go through five stages: precondi-
tion, initiating event, cascade events, final state and restoration
[3]. The precondition usually happens in the winter or summer
peak time due to the excessive power demand. The initiating
event (e.g., short-circuit, overload, protection hidden failure,
etc.) triggers the chain reaction of branch outages, which starts
the cascade events. During the cascade event, power systems
may take protective actions such as load shedding and gen-
eration dispatch to prevent the cascading failure. If protective
actions fail to prevent the further cascades, power systems may
end up with the final state of cascading failures, which tends
to result in the blackout. As a result, the recovery strategy
has to be taken in order to restore the normal state of power
grids. To avoid the occurrence of cascading blackouts, it would
be desirable to identify the initial malicious disturbances or
contingencies before cascading failures, so that the precautions
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can be taken in advance to eliminate the risk of power system
blackouts.
Some identification approaches have been developed to
search for the critical branches or initial malicious disturbances
that can cause the large-scale disruptions [4]–[11]. For in-
stance, some methods are proposed to identify the collections
of n− k contingencies based on the event trees [4], line
outage distribution factor [5] and other optimization techniques
[6]–[8]. Nevertheless, these optimization approaches are not
efficient to identify the large collections of n−k contingencies
that result in cascading blackouts. To address this problem, a
“random chemistry” algorithm is designed with the relatively
low computational complexity [9]. In addition, an optimal con-
trol approach is proposed to identify the initial contingencies
by treating these contingencies as the control inputs [10], [11].
The above optimal control approach is able to identify the
continuous changes of branch impedance other than direct
branch outages as the initial contingencies. Moreover, it can
be extended to identify the dangerous fluctuation of injected
power on buses caused by the generation of renewable energies
or load variations [12]. It is demonstrated that the optimal
control approach can effectively determine the worst-case
cascades of power grids without protective actions.
As is well known, protective actions such as load shedding
and generation dispatch play a key role in preventing cascading
blackouts of power grids. This work aims to extend the optimal
control approach to identify the malicious contingencies by
taking into account protective actions during the cascades. The
main challenge in theory is to incorporate protective actions
in the framework of optimal control theory, since protective
actions are taken according to solutions of a different optimiza-
tion problem (linear or nonlinear programming). By converting
both the optimal control problem and the optimization problem
for protective actions into an integrated system of algebraic
equations, we manage to formulate and solve the problem of
identifying initial contingencies that could lead to the worst-
case cascading failures in power grids endowed with protective
actions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II formulates the contingency identification problem of power
grids involving protective actions in the framework of optimal
control theory. Section III presents the theoretical analysis of
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Fig. 1: Schematic diagram on the identification of power
system cascades with protective actions.
the optimal control problem. Section IV provides simulation
results to validate the proposed approach. Finally, the conclu-
sion is drawn in Section V.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
This section presents the problem formulation of identifying
the most disruptive disturbances on transmission lines of
power grids with n branches and m buses. Figure 1 presents
an illustration of identifying the worst-case cascades of power
grids with protective actions in the framework of optimal
control theory. When the initial contingency or disturbance is
added on the branch of power grids, the branch impendence is
changed. This leads to the redistribution of power flow on the
branches. If the power flow on the branch exceeds its thresh-
old, the branch is severed with the change of network topology.
The above branch outage could result in the overloads of
other branches and give rise to the further cascades. At the
given cascading step (e.g., the l-th cascading step in Fig. 1),
protective actions (e.g., load shedding and generation dispatch)
are taken to prevent the cascading failure. The above cascade
process can be described by the state equation in optimal
control theory. By designing a cost function to quantify the
final disruption level of cascading failures, an optimal control
algorithm can be developed to obtain the optimal control in-
puts, which are exactly the initial contingencies or disturbances
that can cause the worst-case cascading failures.
By treating the branch impedance or admittance as the state
variable, a state equation can be established to characterize
the line outage sequence during the power system cascades.
The power flow on each branch is obtained by solving the
power flow equation. The protective actions during cascades
are implemented at the given cascading step by adjusting
the injected power on buses. Finally, an optimal control
problem is formulated to search for the initiating event of
cascading blackouts with the consideration of load shedding
and generation dispatch.
A. State equation
The state equation is used to describe the line outage
sequence of power grids during cascades. Suppose the status
of branch or transmission line depends on both the power flow
on the branch and its threshold. Thus, an approximate function
on the branch status is designed to characterize the operation
of circuit breaker in protective relays as follows
g(Pi j,ci j) =

0, |Pi j| ≥
√
c2i j +
pi
2σ ;
1, |Pi j| ≤
√
c2i j− pi2σ ;
1−sinσ(P2i j−c2i j)
2 , otherwise.
where σ is a tunable positive parameter. Pi j refers to the
power flow on the branch between Bus i and Bus j, and
ci j denotes its threshold of power flow. Pi j can be obtained
by solving the power flow equation. Notably, the function
g is differentiable with respect to Pi j, and it approximates
to the step function as the parameter σ increases. It can
reflect the physical characteristic of protective relays while
contributing to theoretical analysis on the identification of
initial contingencies using optimal control theory.
The line outage sequence can be described by the following
state equation (i.e., branch outage model in Figure 1)
Y k+1p = G(P
k
i j) ·Y kp +Eik uk (1)
where Y kp = (y
k
p,1,y
k
p,2, ...,y
k
p,n)
T ∈ Rn refers to the vector of
branch admittance, and the control input or disturbance is
denoted by uk = (uk,1,uk,2, ...,uk,n)T . In addition, G(Pki j) is a
diagonal matrix
G(Pki j) =

g(Pi1 j1 ,ci1 j1) 0 . 0
0 g(Pi2 j2 ,ci2 j2) . 0
. . . .
0 0 . g(Pin jn ,cin jn)

and it describes the status of each branch at the k-th cascading
step. The matrix Eik is constructed as
Eik = diag
(
eTik
)
= diag(0, ..,0,1︸ ︷︷ ︸
ik
,0, ...,0) ∈ Rn×n
and it enables us to select the ik-th branch for adding the initial
disturbances.
B. DC power flow equation
For high-voltage transmission systems, the DC power flow
is a good substitute for the AC power flow [13], and it is
computationally efficient and immune to the numerical non-
convergence. Thus, the DC power flow equation is employed
in this work. The classic DC power flow equation is given by
Pi =
m
∑
j=1
Bi jθi j =
m
∑
j=1
Bi j(θi−θ j) (2)
where Pi and θi refer to the injection power and voltage
phase angle of Bus i, respectively. Bi j represents the mutual
susceptance between Bus i and Bus j. The symbol m denotes
the number of buses in power networks. Equation (2) can be
rewritten in matrix form [14]
P = Bθ
where P = (P1,P2, ...,Pm), θ = (θ1,θ2, ...,θm) and
B =

∑mi=2 B1i −B12 . B1m
−B21 ∑mi=1,i6=2 B2i . B2m
. . . .
−Bm1 −Bm2 . ∑m−1i=1 Bmi

It is worth pointing out that B can be obtained by removing
the real part of Yb. In fact, the nodal admittance matrix Y kb at
the k-th cascading step can be obtained as
Y kb = A
T diag(Y kp )A
where A denotes the branch-bus incidence matrix [15]. Thus,
the power flow on the branch between Bus i and Bus j can
be computed as
Pki j = e
T
i Y
k
b e j(ei− e j)T (Y kb )−1
∗
Pk, i, j ∈ Im = {1,2, ...,m}
where ei is the m-dimensional unit vector with 1 at the i-th
position and 0 elsewhere. Pk refers to the vector of injected
power on buses at the k-th cascading step. The symbol −1∗
represents a generalized inverse for solving DC power flow
equation [10].
Remark II.1. During the cascading blackout, power network
may be divided into several subnetworks (i.e., islands), which
can be identified by analyzing the nodal admittance matrix
Y kb . To solve the DC power flow equation, the generator bus
connected to the largest generating station is selected as the
new slack bus in the subnetwork. And thus the power variation
of slack bus accounts for a small percentage of its generating
capacity. If there is no generator bus in the subnetwork, the
power flow is zero on each branch of this subnetworks.
C. Protective actions
If generation dispatch and load shedding are taken into
account in the formulation, Pk has to be updated at certain
steps of cascading failure. For simplicity, suppose that load
shedding and generation control are implemented at the l-th
cascading step (1 < l < h). This implies that Pk = Pl for k≥ l.
Thus, a nonlinear programming problem can be proposed to
allow for load shedding and generation dispatch as follows
min
Pl
‖Pl−P0‖2
s. t. Pi ≤ Pli ≤ P¯i
− ci j ≤ Pli j ≤ ci j
(3)
where Pl = (Pl1,P
l
2, ...,P
l
m)
T , and P0 denotes the vector of
original injected power on buses. The symbols Pi and P¯i
denote the upper and lower bounds of injected power on Bus i,
respectively. The cost function in (3) quantifies the changes of
injected power on buses due to load shedding and generation
control. Essentially, the objective of Optimization Problem (3)
is to achieve the minimum adjustment of injected power on
buses while preventing the further branch outages of power
grids.
Remark II.2. The linear programming formulation can also
be adopted to allow for protection actions in power systems
[16]. The proposed approach is also applied to the linear
programming formulation. In addition, it also has a chance
to be extended for dealing with protection actions at multiple
cascading steps.
D. Cost function
Next, a cost function of optimal control problem is presented
to quantify the disruption level of power grids at the end of
cascading failures. Suppose the cascades come to an end at
the h-th cascading step, and the cost function is designed as
min
uk
J(Y hp ,uk) (4)
with
J(Y hp ,uk) = Γ(Y
h
p )+ ε
h−1
∑
k=0
‖uk‖2
max{0,1− k}
and the adjustment of injected power on buses Pk for the
system protection is implemented according to the solutions to
Optimization Problem (3) at the l-th cascading step. The first
term in the cost function (i.e., Γ(Y hp )) describes the final status
of cascading failures (e.g., network connectivity or power
flow), and the second term characterizes the accumulated
control energy. In addition, ε is a positive weight, and the
symbol ‖ · ‖ represents the 2-norm. Normally, ε is small
enough so that more efforts are taken to minimize the first
term in the cost function.
Remark II.3. The second term in the cost function ensures
that only initial disturbances can be added on the branch of
power transmission system. This is due to max{0,1− k} = 1
for k = 0 and max{0,1− k}= 0 for k ≥ 1. When max{0,1−
k}= 0, the second term goes to the infinity. This implies that
it is impossible to minimize the cost function when k ≥ 1.
III. THEORETICAL RESULTS
This section provides theoretical results on the identifica-
tion of initial contingencies on branches that can cause the
catastrophic cascading failures of power grids. First of all, an
equivalent condition is presented for Problem (3).
Lemma III.1. The optimal solutions of Optimization Problem
(3) are equivalent to the solutions of the following system of
algebraic equations
2(Pl−P0)+ µ¯−µ+ ∑
(i, j)∈Ω
(λ¯i j−λ i j)eTi Y lbe j(Y lb)−1
∗
ei j = 0
Pli − P¯i + x¯2i = 0, µ¯i(Pli − P¯i) = 0, µ¯i− z¯2i = 0
Pi−Pli + x2i = 0, µ i(P
l
i −Pi) = 0, µ i− z
2
i = 0
Pli j− ci j + y¯2i j = 0, (Pli j− ci j)λ¯i j = 0, λ¯i j− w¯2i j = 0
Pli j + ci j− y2i j = 0, (Pli j + ci j)λ i j = 0, λ i j−w2i j = 0
(5)
where Y lb = A
T diag(Y lp)A, ei j = ei− e j, i ∈ Im, (i, j) ∈Ω, µ¯ =
(µ¯1, µ¯2, ..., µ¯m)T and µ = (µ1,µ2, ...,µm)
T . And the symbol
Ω denotes the set of branches in power systems with the
cardinality |Ω|= n (i.e., the number of branches).
Proof. The inequality constraints in the optimization problem
(3) can be converted into the equality constraints by introduc-
ing the unknown variables x¯i, xi, y¯i j and yi j as follows.
min
Pl
‖Pl−P0‖2
s. t. Pli − P¯i + x¯2i = 0
Pi−Pli + x2i = 0
Pli j− ci j + y¯2i j = 0
Pli j + ci j− y2i j = 0
(6)
According to the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions, the
necessary condition for the solutions to Optimization Problem
(6) can be obtained as follows. Specifically, we have
∇‖Pl−P0‖2 + µ¯−µ+ ∑
(i, j)∈Ω
(λ¯i j−λ i j)eTi Y lbe j(Y lb)−1
∗
ei j = 0
with ∇‖Pl −P0‖2 = 2(Pl −P0) for the stationarity condition
and the constraints
Pli − P¯i + x¯2i = 0, Pli j− ci j + y¯2i j = 0
Pi−Pli + x2i = 0, Pli j + ci j− y2i j = 0
The conditions for complementary slackness are given by
µ¯i(Pli − P¯i) = 0, (Pli j− ci j)λ¯i j = 0
µ
i
(Pli −Pi) = 0, (Pli j + ci j)λ i j = 0
Moreover, the dual feasibility can be described by
µ¯i− z¯2i = 0, λ¯i j− w¯2i j = 0
µ
i
− z2i = 0 λ i j−w2i j = 0
where ei j = ei−e j, i∈ Im, (i, j)∈Ω, µ¯ = (µ¯1, µ¯2, ..., µ¯m)T and
µ = (µ
1
,µ
2
, ...,µ
m
)T . Since the cost function in Optimization
Problem (3) is a convex function and the inequality constraints
are affine, the above necessary conditions are also sufficient
for optimality. This implies that the solutions to Optimization
Problem (3) are equivalent to solutions to the system of
algebraic equations (6). The proof of this lemma is thus
completed.
Remark III.1. As we can see, System (5) is composed
of (7m + 6n) equations and (7m + 6n) additional unknown
variables (i.e., Pl , wi j, w¯i j, λ i j, λ¯i j, yi j, y¯i j, xi, x¯i, zi, z¯i, µ i,
µ¯i). Note that Y lb contains the existing unknown variables Y
l
p
in the state equation (1).
The equivalent conditions in Lemma III.1 allows to obtain
the necessary conditions for the optimal control problem (4)
as follows
Theorem III.1. The necessary conditions for the optimal
control problem (4) with protective actions according to (3) are
given by solving the system of algebraic equations as follows Y k+1p −G(Pki j)Y kp −
max{0,1−k}
2ε Eik ∏
h−k−2
s=0
∂Y h−sp
∂Y h−s−1p
1n = 0
F (Y lp,P
l ,wi j, w¯i j,λ i j, λ¯i j,yi j, y¯i j,xi, x¯i,zi, z¯i,µ i, µ¯i) = 0
(7)
where the second equation represents System (5), and the
optimal adjustment of injected power on buses for protective
actions satisfies Pk = Pl for k ≥ l, and Pl is the solution to
Problem (3). In addition, the optimal control input is given by
uk =
max{0,1− k}
2ε
Eik
h−k−2
∏
s=0
∂Y h−sp
∂Y h−s−1p
1n, k ∈ Ih−1 (8)
Proof. With Pontryagin’s maximum principle in optimal con-
trol theory for the discrete-time system [17], the necessary
conditions for the optimal control problem (4) can be deter-
mined as
Y k+1p = G(P
k
i j) ·Y kp +Eik uk
(
∂Y k+1p
∂uk
)T
λk+1 +
ε
max{0,1− k} ·
∂‖uk‖2
∂uk
= 0
λk =
(
∂Y k+1p
∂Y kp
)T
λk+1 +
ε
max{0,1− k} ·
∂‖uk‖2
∂Y kp
∂T(Y hp )
∂Y hp
−λh = 0
where 0= (0,0, ...,0)T ∈ Rn. By reorganizing the above equa-
tions, we can obtain the optimal control input
uk =
max{0,1− k}
2ε
Eik
h−k−2
∏
s=0
∂Y h−sp
∂Y h−s−1p
1n, k ∈ Ih−1
and the system of algebraic equations
Y k+1p −G(Pki j)Y kp −
max{0,1− k}
2ε
Eik
h−k−2
∏
s=0
∂Y h−sp
∂Y h−s−1p
1n = 0
(9)
where the vector Pl is determined by the solutions to System
(5), which can be rewritten as
F (Y lp,P
l ,wi j, w¯i j,λ i j, λ¯i j,yi j, y¯i j,xi, x¯i,zi, z¯i,µ i, µ¯i) = 0 (10)
for ease of notation according to Lemma III.1. By com-
bining Equations (9) and (10), an extended system of alge-
braic equations is obtained with 7m+(6+h)n equations and
7m+(6+h)n unknown variables. By substituting the solutions
of this extended system into (8), we can identify the most
disruptive disturbances for the cascades of power grids with
protective actions at the given cascading step. This completes
the proof
Remark III.2. The extended system of algebraic equations
(7) can be solved using the numerical solver in numerical-
analysis softwares. In this way, load shedding and generation
Fig. 2: IEEE RTS 24 bus system with initial disturbances on
branches (red star)
dispatch can be taken into account in the proposed optimal
control formulation of identifying the worst-case cascading
failures.
Remark III.3. Since the solutions to System (7) can only
provide necessary conditions for the optimal control problem
(4), extensive numerical simulations have to be conducted to
search for the feasible solutions in practice. By comparing the
values of cost function with the identified initial disturbances
(i.e., control inputs), it is expected to obtain the optimal or
suboptimal solutions to Problem (4) if numerical simulations
are repeated for a sufficiently large number of times.
IV. SIMULATION AND VALIDATION
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed identifica-
tion approach based on optimal control, numerical simulations
are conducted on the IEEE RTS 24 Bus System to determine
the initial disruptive disturbances on each branch (see Fig. 2).
In addition, we make a comparison on simulation results
between the cases with and without protective actions (i.e.,
load shedding and generation dispatch), respectively.
A. Parameter setting
Per unit values are adopted with the base value of power 100
MVA. Moreover, the solver “fsolve” in Matlab is employed to
solve the integrated system of algebraic equations (7). Other
parameters are given as follows: σ = 5×104, ε = 10−4, h =
10, and Γ(Y hp ) = ‖Y hp ‖2/2 in the cost function (4). For each
branch, numerical simulations are carried out to solve System
(7) for 10 times, and the worst-case disturbances are selected
by comparing the values of cost function. A performance index
γ is defined to quantify the disruption level of cascades as
follows
γ =
J(Y hp ,u)
J(Y hp ,0)
.
Intuitively, the index γ is the ratio between the final cost of
power grids with the control input u and that without any
control inputs, and a smaller γ indicates a worse cascade of
power systems. The power flow threshold on each branch is
10% larger than the normal power flow on the corresponding
branch of power systems without any disturbances.
B. Validation and comparison
In the simulations, generation dispatch and load shedding
are implemented at the 4-th cascading step (i.e., l = 4) accord-
ing to solutions of Optimization Problem (3). Figure 3 presents
the initial disturbances (i.e., control inputs) on each branch
identified by the proposed optimal control approach and the
resulting normalized costs (i.e., the index γ). Specifically,
the blue bars denote the control inputs and normalized costs
without generation dispatch and load shedding, while the green
bars represent those with generation dispatch and load shed-
ding. As we can observe in the upper panel of Figure 3, the
height of green bar is not smaller than that of blue bar for each
branch. This indicates that the larger initial disturbances (i.e.,
the magnitude of control input) are required to trigger the
worst-case cascades of power grids with generation dispatch
and load shedding compared to those without generation
dispatch and load shedding. This demonstrates that protection
actions are able to effectively enhance the robustness of power
systems and relieve the final disruption level after malicious
disturbances. It is worth pointing out that the branches with
equal heights of blue bar and green bar (e.g., Branch 1, Branch
2, Branch 3, Branch 4, Branch 5, Branch 6, etc) are directly
severed by the initial disturbances (i.e., control inputs). The
lower panel of Figure 3 demonstrates that the cascades with
generation dispatch and load shedding are less disruptive on
the whole except for the cascades triggered by the initial
disturbances on Branch 28, Branch 32 and Branch 33. This is
because the optimal solutions for generation dispatch and load
shedding (i.e., solutions to the optimization problem (3)) are
not obtained by the numeric solver at the specified cascading
step. Thus, the adjustment of injected power on buses (i.e.,
generation dispatch and load shedding) actually deteriorates
branch overloads and results in the worse disruptions of
cascades in the end.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigated the problem of identifying
the initial contingencies that result in the worst-case cascading
failures of power grids. In particular, power grids are equipped
with protection devices to prevent the cascading blackouts
by load shedding or generation dispatch in time. Moreover,
a theoretical framework was proposed to allow for both the
identification of the most disruptive disturbances and the op-
timal adjustment of injected power buses for the protection of
power girds. Numerical simulations were conducted to better
understand the effect of protection actions on the identification
of initial malicious contingencies and the final disruptions of
cascading failures. In this work, the deterministic cascading
failure paths are taken into account for the identification
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Fig. 3: Control inputs and normalized costs of the cascades
with and without generation dispatch and load shedding on
the IEEE RTS 24 Bus System.
of initial disruptive disturbances and the implementation of
protective actions. In practice, power grids are subject to
uncertainties (e.g., hidden failure, device aging, human errors,
etc). Therefore, we will consider the contingency identification
of power grids with uncertain cascading failure paths in the
next step.
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